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March, 1933 Circular No.147 
The Agricultural ~mergency in Iowa 
IX. Fann Mortgage Foreclosures 
By WILLIA:u: G. MUltllAY and RoNALD C. BENTLEY 
AGRICULTURAL EXPERIMENT STATION 
IOWA STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE AND 
AfECHANIC ARTS 
R. 11. Htrctta, Acting Dir«tor 
AGRICULTURAL ECOSOJ.llCS SECflON 
AMES, IOWA 
FOREWORD 
Two facts on the mortgage situation need to be emphasized. 
In the first place, the majority of outstanding mortgages are 
first mortgages held by lending institutions with obligations 
to meet in the future that are based on these mortgages. In 
the second place, foreclosures are not a· new development. For 
the last 12 years in Iowa a steady liquidation has taken place. 
Yet 1 billion dollars of farm mortgages are still outstanding. 
What can be done? Without question every lender and bor-
rower should be familiar with the recent Mortgage Mora-
torium Act, a copy of which is included in the Appendix. In 
addition, what is needed is the cooperative study and action of 
both debtors and creditors on income-raising proposals. Agi-
tation between debtors and creditors by itself will not correct 
the maladjustment. Both parties, lenders as well as borrowers, 
are suffering from the same trouble, low farm income . 
. This circular has been divided into two parts, the first deal-
ing with foreclosure data, particularly as they relate to the 
period 1921-32, and the second with proposed solutions. The 
authors are indebted to the staff of the Agricultural Economics 
Department for help in the preparation of this report. 
This publication is the ninth in the series on the agricul-
tural emergency in Iowa. The next circular will deal with 
alternative foreign trade policies. 
The Agricultural ~mergency in Iowa 
IX. Farm Mortgage Foreclosures 
By WILLIAM G. Muu.AY and RoNALD C. BENTLEY 
A diagnosis of the foreclosure situation reveals low prices 
for farm products and a large debt as the salient facts contrib-
uting to the present crisis. This much is clear. Not so clear is 
the long struggle waged in the last 12 years by farm owners 
and their creditors against inadequate farm income. 
Foreclosures and deficiency judgments have been a common 
occurrence in Iowa since 1921. In the last 12 years 13 percent 
of the farm land in Iowa has been sold by sheriffs at foreclo-
sure sales. This is indicated by a study of all foreclosures in 
15 counties. In some cases the same farm has been sold twice 
or even three times in the 12-year period. When a deduction 
is made so as to count these farms only once there still remains 
11 percent of the state which has been affected by foreclo-
sures. In other words, one out of every nine farms in Iowa 
has been sold one or more times by the sheriff in the period 
1921-32. Deficiency judgments have been common likewise; 
over 52 percent of all foreclosures since 1920 have resulted in 
a deficiency judgment against the farm owner. 
Mortgages totaling 327 million dollars have been cancelled 
by foreclosure action in Iowa in the years 1921-32. An amount 
almost equally as large has been cut out by assignments of 
land to mortgage holders and by the failure of junior mort-
gage holders to redeem the land after the foreclosure of a 
prior lien•. At the end of 1932, however, 1 billion dollars of 
farm mortgage debt was still outstanding on 45 percent of the 
farm land in the state. · 
Cominjr as it does after 12 years of financial difficulties, the 
present impasse constitutes a crisis of serious proportions. 
Reserves are exhausted and prices of farm products are near 
the lowest levels of the state's history. 
Fint Mortgage Difficulties 
To some the problem is merely one of liquidating second 
and third mortgages originating in the land boom. Careful 
study, however, of the developments since the intense land 
sale activity of 1919-20 leads to a different conclusion. The 
majority of the second and third mortgages contracted during 
tSee Circular J.42. Jo- Farm llon112ge Situation, Iowa A11'. Exp. Sta., ]anu. 
ary, l9ll. bata from tlai• circular are used tlaroupout tlail stud)'. 
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the high land value years were cancelled in the period 1921-30. 
Since 1930, mortgages in default have been chiefly first liens, 
held by conservative lending institutions. Although many of 
these loans arose out of land purchase transactions in the 
World War decade, they were not considered excessive during 
the years 1921-30. In fact, lending agencies competed with 
each other to make first mortgage loans in these years. 
The extent to which conservative investors are involved is 
indicated by the recent increase in first mortgage foreclosures 
by insurance companies and land banks. Insurance companies 
loaned as high as $100 an acre on high-grade land during the 
period 1921-29. These loans were restricted by the policy of 
the companies and by legal provisions to first mortgages rep-
resenting not more than SO percent of the value of the land. 
Federal and joint stock land banks were similarly restricted 
and were also lending $100 an acre in the same years on the 
best land-land which by these loans was valued at $200. 
Moreover, these agencies were not merely holding a constant 
amount of such mortgages, they were taking on more. Out-
standing farm mc;>rtgage loans of insurance companies and 
land banks in Iowa rose from $386,000,000 in 1921 to $660,-
000,000 in 1929. 
The 90's and 1932-33 Compared 
The distinctive features of the present debt problem are 
brought into full view by a comparison of the depression in 
the nineties with that at present. Let us look, therefore, at 
debts and the ability of the farmer to meet them in the two 
periods. 
In the depression of the nineties, $14 to $16 was the average 
debt per acre on mortgaged land (see fig. 1). In October, 
1932, the debt stood at $71 an acre on mortgaged land. If 
farmers were having a difficult time meeting their interest 
during the depression of the middle nineties, how much more 
severe must be the depression of 1933 with the debt four and 
five times as large. 
With the debt situation clearly in mind, let ·us examine the 
ability of the farmer to meet his obligations. If income figures 
were available for the two periods, no difficulty would be en-
countered in clearing up this point. It is well known that 
taxes were lower in the early period and that production was 
smaller, but no income figures are to be had. Therefore, it 
will be necessary to fall back on prices o( farm products as the 
best means of measuring the farmer's ability to meet financial 
obligations. .. 
Hogs constituted the major source of income in both pe-
riods. An average of $3.95 a hundred was received for·hogs 
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in central Iowa for the years 189()..99. The low years were 
1896-97 with average prices at $2.95 and $3.20, respectively. 
The high years of the decade were 1892-93 with prices at $4.50 
and $5.80. In 1932, on the other hand, the average price of 
hogs_ was $3.20. For January, 1933, farmers received only 
$2.40. This is lower than in any month during the nineties. 
Cattl_e, next to ~ogs in importance, sold lower in the nineties 
than in recent months. The average price for the nineties was 
$3.15. This is low compared with the average of $4.90 in 1932. 
Evil days have finally fallen upon cattle prices, however, for 
the February, 1933, price was only $3.90. · 
Corn like hogs held a better position in the nineties than at 
present. Jn the ninetie$ an average of 26 cents a bushel was 
teceived for corn. In 1897 the price paid averaged only 15" 
cents and in 1892 an average of 42 cents was paid at local 
shipping points. Although the average price was 23 cents 
during 1932, in February, 1933, shelled corn brought only 12 
cents a bushel. 
One more product' will be considered, namely, butter. In 
this case a similarity with cattle can he observed. During the 
nineties butt~r brought an average of 15 cents a pound. The 
year 1890 was low with a price of 9 cents, 1892 and 1894 were 
the high years with butter at 18 cents a pound. During 1932, 
on the other hand, butter brought 20 cents a pound and during 
February, 1933, 18 cents a pound. 
--.To sum-marfae, hogs and corn make a poorer showing today 
than in the nineties. Cattle and butter, however, maintain a 
better position at present than in the nin~ties. 
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An explanation of the low prices received for corn and hogs 
in recent months may be found in the export situation which 
has become extremely unfavorable to the corn-hog producer in 
recent years (see Circular No. 146 on tariffs). Hogs at one 
time had an ~port market which has now practically dropped 
out of sight. <;;attle and butter on the contrary had no export 
market to lose, hence one less unfavorable factor with which 
to contend. · 
Prices for all farm products during 1932, on an index basis, 
were on a level with prices received by farmers for their prod-
ucts in the nineties. With 100 the index number for the base 
years 1910...14, prices averaged 56 during 1932 and also 56 for 
the nineties. The low year in the decade was 1897 with an 
index of 46, and the high year 1893 with an index of 68. 
In conclusion it is evident, on the basis of farm product 
prices, that the farm mortgage debt in 1933 is at least four 
times too large. 
What Happened from 1900 to 1920 
The question now arises as to how such a heavy debt as 
$71 an acre was ever incurred against nearly one-half the farm 
land. What happened between the nineties and 1933 is shown 
in detail in fig. 1. Prices of farm products from 1900 to 1919 
climbed almost without interruption and at a steadily increas-
ing pace. Only 4 out of the 19 years showed a lower index than 
the year preceding. While this was taking place, farm income 
was rising and the value of land was being pushed up. Each 
year the farms bought with mortgage credit were mortgaged 
for more dollars per acre than in the preceding year. In fig. 1. 
the two curves, prices of farm products and debt per acre of 
land mortgaged, rise together. The period 1900-19, therefore, 
witnessed the conversion of land value increases into mortgage 
debts. 
What took place fotlowing the price recession in 1920, as 
well as in previous depressions, is best presented by a record 
of farm-mortgage foreclosures. 
Foreclosures in the Past 
Foreclosures were frequent in the years 1858-60 because farm 
owners had assumed mortgages in the boom year 1857 which 
they couldn't meet during the depression years that followed2• 
So intense was the agitation at this time for relief that the 
state legislature passed a bill which became a law in March, 
IFom:losure Information for the yean 1854-1914 comes from a studr of Boone and 
Storr rountles; for the run 1915·32 from a atudr of IS counties. · 
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1860, allowing 9 months' time between notice of foreclosure 
and action by the court. This act continued in effect until 
Jan. 1, 18611• · 
Other waves of foreclosures came with low prices in the 
seventies and late eighties. No action was taken by the state 
legislature in either of these instances, however. In the middle 
nineties prices declined again, but foreclosures were not a 
serious problem. This is explained by the fact that prices of 
farm products during the preceding years had not been high. 
Consequently, the mortgage debt load was not heavy enough 
to cause widespread defaults • 
.. From 1900 through 1920, foreclosures of farm mortgages 
were almost unheard of. What cases did come before the 
courts were largely disputes and settlements of estates. 
Foreclosures, 1921-30 
In 1921, according to fig. 2, the increase in foreclosures indi-
cated that the liquidation of the land boom had started. As 
much land was foreclosed in 1921 as in the six preceding years. 
The cause for these foreclosures can readily be ipferred from 
the drop in prices of farm products as shown in fig. 1. 
The years that followed 1921 saw no let-up in the steady 
liquidation of all mortgages which could not be handled with 
•For full text oE this Act sec the Appendix • 
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prices fluctuating between an index of 120 and 150. Slightly 
less than .1 percent of the farm land in the state was fore-
closed in 1922 and 1923. In the next 4 years, however, over 
1 percent of the land in the state was sold annually by the 
sheriff. 
This figure of 1 percent a year may not seem large by itself, 
but when there is added to it another 1 percent or thereabouts 
representing land assigned by the owner to mortgage holders, 
the liquidation cannot be considered other than significant. 
By 1930 the liquidation of second and third mortgages was 
largely complete. If the junior mortgage debt (including sec-
ond, third and fourth mortgages) for 1915 is called 100 per-
cent, this type of debt had risen almost four times or to 390 
in 1921. At the close of 1930, however, it was back to 150. 
During this interval the decline in first mortgage debt was 
relatively small. · 
While junior mortgages were being foreclosed, scaled down 
or cancelled through assignment, insurance companies and 
land banks were expanding their farm mortgage holdings. At 
the close of 1921, insurance companies had $334,000,000 in 
Iowa farm mortgages; in 1927, a total of $507,775,000. From 
1927 the total declined to $482,900,000 at the end of 1930. The 
Federal Land Bank of Omaha had $27,562,000 outstanding in 
Iowa at the close of 1921 and $82,465,000 at the close of 1930. 
Joint stock land banks had $24,999,000 in Iowa farm mort-
gages on Dec. 31, 1921, and $82,925,000 9 years later. These 
figures indicate that a large portion of the mortgage loans of 
these companies was taken on during a period of agricultural 
depression. 
First Mortgage Foreclosures, 1931-32 
Foreclosure, assignment and scaling down of first mortgages 
were under way as early as 1925 but did not bulk large until 
1931. Those cases which were settled prior to 1931 included 
farms on which a heavy first mortgage loan had been made 
and farms held by non-operators who were in financial dif-
ficulties. First mortgage liquidation was the exception, not 
the rule. 
With the year 1931, first mortgages took the center of the 
stage. This was caused by the violent drop in prices of farm 
products which occurred in, this year, the index declining from 
127 to 86. Over l ~ percent of. the land was sold at foreclosure 
sale. In the first 11 months of 1932, the situation became still 
worse. Prices dropped to 56 in 1932 and foreclosures claimed 
practically 3 percent of all farm land. This brings us down to 
the farm mortgage moratorium issued by the governor of Iowa 
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in January, 1933, and the standstill enactment of the state 
legislature passed in the following month'. 
Changes in the number of foreclosures have been accom-
panied by similar changes in amount of mortgage debt can-
celled by foreclosure action (fig. 3). While few loans were cut 
out by foreclosure in the years 1915-20, in the years since 1920 
approximately 327 million dollars has been involved in judg-
ments handed down by the courts. From 1922 through 1930, 
20 to 25 million dollars annually was the average for the state. 
In 1932, up to Dec. 1, 68 million dollars, it is estimated, was 
defaulted and cancelled through foreclosure sale. If figures 
were available for the entire year, the result :would probably 
show upwards of $75,000,000, or $759,000 to a county. 
There appears to be no region in the state that has been 
exempt from foreclosures. This is evident from fig. 4, a map 
showing the 15 counties for which foreclosure information was 
obtained for the last 18 years. The first vertical bar in each 
county represents the acreage involved in foreclosure in the 
5-year period 1921-25, the next bar for the following 5-year 
period 1926-30, and the third bar for the 2-year period 1931-32. 
The dark shaded portions represent the percentage of the 
acreage on which deficiency judgments ·were secured. This 
!'lubject of deficiencies will be discussed in a later section of 
this study. To return to the map, Clarke, Cerro Gordo, Guth-
•For full tat ol lhi1 Act see the Appendix. · 
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JI In Appendix.) 
rie and Hancock counties lead in the percentage of land fore-
closed. Cedar, ·Boone and Cherokee counties at the other end 
of the list, had relatively few foreclosures. Three important 
reasons account for the variations among counties. First, the 
amount of land purchases during the 1910-20 period varied as 
between counties; second, in some . counties the ability and 
willingness of farm owners to hang on to their farms exceeded 
that in other counties; and third, the assignment of land to 
mortgage holders took the place of foreclosure in some coun-
ties more than in others. 
In the last 2 years, it will be noted, there have been as 
many foreclosures as in either of the two preceding 5-year pe-
riods. This is the result of the drastic price cut of 1931-32 
which caught farm owners ill-prepared to meet such a crisis. 
In 1921 financial reserves enabled many farm owners to hold 
on, while in 1931 reserves were largely exhausted. 
Who Did the Foreclosing? 
Private investors, deposit banks and mortgage companies 
did most of the foreclosing of farm mortgages in the years 
1920-25 (fig. 5). As was mentioned previously these were the 
years when junior mortgages were foreclosed. Many of the 
second and third mortgages arising out of land transactions 
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were held by private investors, a group which includes former 
owners of land. 
From 1926 on,' a new group of mortgage holders rises in im-
portance. This group includes institutional investors whose 
mortgages are limited to first mortgages. The institutions are 
the insurance companies, the Federal Land Bank and joint 
stock land banks. In 1925 this group accounted for only 17 
percent of all foreclosures, in 1930 for 45 percent and in 1932 
for 73 percent. 
The shift from private investors and deposit banks to insur-
ance companies and land banks is fundamental to an under-
standing of present foreclosure problems. It represents a 
transition from liquidation of junior mortgage debts to liquida-
tion of debts that were considered by lending institutions as 
anything but speculative. 
Deficiency Judgments Increase 
In all but one of the last 12 years, each succeeding year has 
witnessed a larger proportion of foreclosures resulting in 
deficiency judgments. In 1921 only 26.5 percent of the .fore-
closure sales ended with the land bid in for less than the judg-
ment against it. In 1926, the percentage bid in for less than 
the judgment amounted to 44 percent and finally in 1932 over 
74 percent were bought with a deficiency remaining. This 
trend'tow~rd more deficiency judgments is pictured in fig. 2. 
A deficiency judgment can be made clear by an example. 
A mortgage for $16,000 on 160 acres is foreclosed. The total 
20 
1931 19M 
Fig, 5. Percentage distribution o! acreage !o_rcclosed by lenders, 15 counties, 1921· 
1932. 
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Fig. 6. Prrcentage distribution of acreage involved in deficiency judgments by 
lenders, 14 counties, 1921·1932. 
amount against the land at the time of foreclosure sale is 
$17,500. This includes the original judgment allowed by the 
court of unpaid principal, interest and taxes, plus interest and 
costs since the case was started. At the foreclosure sale, the 
sheriff sells the land to the mortgage holder on a bid for 
$15,000. As a result, a deficiency of $2,500 stands against the 
person or persons who are Hable on the original note for 
$16,000. 
In recent years, particularly since the advent of insurance 
companies, deficiency judgments have not been large in 
amount. The purpose of the bid lower than the judgment has 
been to make possible the appointment of a receiver so .that 
an equivalent of rent can be obtained from the property dur-
ing the year of redemption. Further this practice means the 
mortgage holder avoids bidding an amount which includes 
accumulated interest and taxes in addition to the principal of 
the mortgage. This allows the company bidding in the land 
to keep accumulated interest in such cases from showing up 
in its income account. . 
The pradice of securing deficiency judgments against farm 
owners in foreclosure has been common with all lending 
agencies (fig. 6). The variations between lenders follows 
closely the situation with respect to all foreclosures. In the 
early years, up to 1928, private investors and deposit banks 
were the main parties obtaining deficiency judgments. In 
recent years, particularly since 1930, insurance companies and 
land banks have stepped into the lead. 
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SOLUTIONS 
The discussion thus far has set forth two facts:· First, that 
the debt is approximately four times too large to be supported 
by the present price level ; second, that the debt now outstand-
ing does not represent junior mortgages but chiefly first mort-
gages originat.ing or renewed in the period 1921-29. 
The problem now is what should be done wit~ the debt out-
standing, 91 percent of which is first mortgage debt. The 
major portion cif this first mortgage debt is owed to institu-
tions who in turn are obligated to bond, policy and deposit 
holders. In February, 1933, the mortgage holdings of different 
lenders were estimated as follows: 
Group I. 
Insurance companies -·····-···-········--·-··-·-··.$ 450,000,000- 45% 
Land banks ····-····--··-········-·-·-·----·-··- 140,000,000- 14% 
Deposit banks ····-·-·······-··-·-·-·····-·----- 160,000,000- 16% 
Gro11/J II. 
Private investors ········-·-···-··--··-··--····- 250,000,000- 25% 
Total-············--···············-··········-·····--..$1,000,000,000-IOOo/o 
The lenders have been listed in two groups. The first in-
cludes those having contract obligations to set against their 
mortgage loans. The second includes private investors gener-
ally without offsetting contracts to other parties. This ques-
tion of offsetting contract obligations has been raised because 
it plays such an important part in all discussions of mortgage 
relief. 
As to what should be done, three points of view and accord-
ingly three methods of action present themselves. The first, 
stripped of its qualifications, is the raising· of farm income 
sufficiently to make possible the payment of interest on present 
debts. The second is turning over all heavily encumbered land 
to the mortgage holders. And the third, an alternative to·the 
second, is scaling down debts to a basis where the interest can 
be paid out of present income. 
At present with foreclosures being held in abeyance until 
March, 1935, no one of these policies is in effect. It would be 
possible, of course, to .continue this moratorium indefinitely, 
allowing mortgage holders whatever the farm produces, the 
equivalent of rent in place of interest. A number of ingenious 
plans have been devised to carry mortgages on this basis, one 
of them being the adjustment of payments to the price level 
of farm products. But the chief purpose of recent legislation 
has been to allow time for public policy to be determined along 
one of the three lines indicated. 
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Raising Farm Income 
The first plan calls for income and price-raising measures 
such as the voluntary domestic allotment plan, removal of 
land from cultivation by government leasing, inflation as by 
reduction in the amount of gold in the dollar, and reduction in 
artificial barriers to international trade. These measures, ex-
cept the leasing of land, have been discussed at length in other 
circulars (see Circulars Nos. 141, 143, 145 and 146). Although 
numerous difficulties, some of them of a serious nature, must 
be overcome before successful execution of any income-raising-
scheme can be accomplished, there is no question as to the 
relief that would follow immediately upon the restoration of, 
say, the 1925-29 price level of farm products. To bring farm 
prices back to this level would solve the problem more quickly 
and more effectively than any other method. Because of the 
satisfactory character of the income-raising solution, it is 
placed first on the list, in spite of the difficulties which stand 
in its way. 
Transfer of Land to Mortgage Holders 
The second solution is the trans£ er of the land from debtor 
to creditor. This has been taking place through foreclosures 
and assignments in Iowa for a period of 12 years. In 1931 and 
1932 transfers of this kind increased at an alarming rate. In 
case of foreclosure, title does not pass until one year after the 
land· is sold by the sheriff at foreclosure sale. Hence the large 
amount of land involved in foreclosures in 1932 will pass into 
the hands of mortgage holders in 1933. As fig. 5 indicates, in-
surance companies and land banks account for 73 percent of all 
land in foreclosure in 1932. This means these institutions are 
to get the bulk of the land transferred in 1933. 
The main drawback to mortga~e holders taking over land 
occurs where an owner is operating th'e farm with, at least, 
average success. For the creditors to assume ownership means 
an economic waste. First of all, a supervision expense is 
added. To manage their land, lending institutions must employ 
capable farm managers. Salaries and expenses for these men 
are no trivial item with farm income as low as it is. With 
adequate supervision, management cost will amount to 50 
cents an acre which is equivalent to 5 percent on a $10 an acre 
mortgage. . 
In the second place, absentee ownership makes for addi-
tional expense in connection with maintenance of the farm. 
The farmer living on his own farm naturally takes an interest 
in keeping the farm in ~ood condition. Work on fences, build-
ings, water system, sotl improvement and weed eradication, 
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he will and can do himself. On the rented farm this is not 
always the case. Here the landlord often faces the Tesponsi-
bility of seeing that this work is done and of paying to have 
it done. 
A final argument against land transfer is the social loss that 
follows. A farm is a home as well as a business. If many of 
the owner-operator farmers are uprooted from their farms and 
placed at the foot of the agricultural ladder, the result would 
be a distinct. loss to rural life. 
Debt Reduction 
Debt reduction, the third plan, has disadvantages also. These 
arise chiefly from the nature of the debts. The debts are large 
and in addition are held for the most part by insurance com-
panies, land banks and savings banks. These institutions, as 
pointed out earlier, have contracts with policy, bond and de-
posit holders which call for specific payments of money at 
some future time. If scaling down of farm mortgages should 
start, the same policy would be demanded by city dwellers for 
the mortgages on their homes, and by other debtors who are 
finding it difficult to meet interest and principal payments. 
A furth_er argument against debt scaling is the difficulty 
encountered in deciding to what level the mortgage should be 
reduced. If a mortgage for $12,000 on 160 acres is in default, 
what reduction will be Tequired to bring about a satisfactory 
solution? In 1929 with farm prices at a level 47 percent above 
pre-war, this debt, we will say, was not too large. Today with 
the price level 57 percent below pre-war, a debt of $3,000 is 
al\ that can be handled providing taxes are not heavy on this 
farm. 
One way to figure the maximum mortgage load is to use 
cash rents. According to cash rent figures, the average farmer 
on average land in Iowa paid $5.80 an acre rent with prices at 
100 (the average "for 1910-14).G With prices as they were in 
1932, at 56, this farmer could pay only $3.25 an acre, or with 
prices at 43 as they were in February, 1933, only $2.50 an acre. 
On this basis a 160-acre farm returned only $520 above operat-
ing expenses in 1932. Out of this sum had to come taxes, up-
keep of the farm and interest on the mortgage. Taxes and 
upkeep woud absorb $300 leaving $220 for interest or 5 percent 
on a mortgage of $4,400. On the basis of prices in February, 
1933, and with taxes and upkeep reduced to $250, only $150 
would be left for interest which is equivalent to 5 percent on 
a mortgage of $3,000. 
•Millard Pede. A Plan For AdJusting Cull Rent to Changa in die Priea of Farm 
Prodaeta.. Iowa A&T. Exp. Sta., Bid. 295. Page 207. October, 1932. · 
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Although a $3,000 mortgage is all that an average quarter 
section farm can support now, the same farm during the years 
1924 to 1930 carried a $12,000 mortgage easily. In these earlier 
years cash rents averaged $8.00 an acre. For the farm in ques-
tion, this meant $1,280 total income out of which came not 
more than $400 for taxes and upkeep. The remainder, $880, 
was ample to cover the interest of $600. 
The case described above may seem exaggerated. True, it 
does not represent the exceptional farmer whose ingenuity 
has enabled him to produce more cheaply than his neighbors. 
But the debt problem does not center on the outstanding 
farmer. It hinges on the ability of the majority of the farmers 
to obtain sufficient income to pay operating expenses, taxes 
and interest. 
To talk to mortgage holders about reducing the face value 
of their mortgages 75 percent, from $12,000 to $3.000, is illogi-
cal. The reply of the mortgage holders is, "What recourse 
will we have if prices and farm income rise in the next few 
years?" The answer is that they would have little chance of 
raising the principal of the mortgage unless such a procedure 
was provided for in a contract drawn up when the mortgage 
was reduced. 
If this last provision is made, then in place of outright debt 
reduction a new plan is substituted calling for adjustment of 
principal and interest payments to income from the property. 
This method is more feasible than unconditional scaling down 
of debts. 
A final argument against the debt reduction or land transfer 
solution is the fact that by arrangements of this kind no relief 
is afforded the mortgage holder. The main difficulty is inade-
quate farm income. To cancel the debt or give the land to the 
mortgage holder does not increase the income from the land. 
In fact, many lending institutions are finding it difficult to 
obtain any income over taxes and upkeep on farms taken over 
through foreclosure or assignment. 
Regardless of the arguments against debt reduction, unless 
income rises, there is no escaping the adjustment of debts. 
And if such a course is necessary on a large scale, what plan 
should be followed? If, for example, at the end of the present 
2-year moratorium, income is still at the present low level, 
what means should be provided for handling the farm mort-
gages in default? 
Three fundamental propositions underlie the satisfactory 
adjustment of debt cases. First, each case must be considered 
as an individual one, on its own merits. In other words. no 
simple plan calling for a reduction of alt debts by a certain 
percentage will prove successful. Circumstances in each situa-
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tion affect the type of adjustment needed. Second, debt ad-
justment can best be completed by arbitration, which means 
the appointment or selection of ooar<,ls to bring about a settle-
ment between debtors and creditors. Councils of this kind 
have been organized already in some Iowa counties. Third, 
some basis for adjustment should be adopted; as for instance, 
reduction in line with prices, or in line with capacity to pay. 
The most successful method for debt adjustment, therefore, 
is the hearing of individual cases by county credit councils or 
boards. These county credit councils composed of public 
spirited men, including at least one lawyer, hear the claims of 
the debtor and his creditors. After studying these claims care-
fully, they outline an agreement satisfactory to all parties. 
Such a procedure, of course, is not as simple as it sounds be-
cause farm owners often have several creditors whose claims 
are difficult to appraise. Moreover, what is agreeable to one 
creditor may not be to another. Nevertheless there is no easy 
solution to the knotty problem of debt adjustment; and what 
has been described 'Comes as close to a solution as is possible 
under our present system of contracts. 
APPENDIX 
This section contains the Mortgage Moratorium Acts of 
1860 and 1933. Every borrower and lender should study care-
fully the act of 1933. Following the copy of the recent act, 
tables are presented showing the foreclosure situation from 
1915 to Dec. 1, 1932, in 15 counties. Tables I and III give the 
number of foreclosures and amount of deht involved by lend-
ers. Tables II and IV classify the acreage in foreclosure by 
counties. Tables V and VI show the deficiency judgments- by 
lenders and percentage of foreclosure sales which have re-
sulted in deficiency judgments. 
Mortgage Moratorium Act of 1860 
· SF£TION 1. Foreclosure. That in actions now commenced, or which may 
hereafter be commenced, in any of the courts of this state, for the fore-
closure of any mortgage or mortgages, the defendants shall not be held to 
answer therein until the expiration of nine months after the date of the 
service of the original notice in such actions on the first defendant served, 
any provision in any law or laws enacted hy the general assembly at its 
present session to the contrary notwithstanding. 
SECTtox 2. From and after the first day of January, one thousand eight 
hundred and sixty-one, this act shall cease to be in force, and the class of 
actions mentioned in this act, shall be governed by roles of practice concern-
ing such actions in force at that time. 
SECTJoN J. Take effect. This act to take effect and be in force from and 
after its publication in the Iowa State Register and the Iowa State Journal, 
newspapers published at Des Moines. 
This bill having remained with the Governor three days; Sunday excepted 
the General Assembly being in Session, has become a law this 21st day 0 { 
March, 1860. 
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Mortgage Moratorium Act of 1933 
SECTION 1. The governor of the state of Iowa having declared that an 
emergency now exists, and the general assembly having detennined that such 
emergency does exist, which is general throughout the state, and that the 
safety and future welfare of the state as a whole is endangered thereby, the 
general assembly acting under the power reserved by the people of Iowa, does 
hereby enact the foUowing: 
SECTION 2. In all actions for the foreclosure of real estate mortgages or 
deeds of trust now pending in which decree has not been entered, and in all 
actions hereafter commenced for the foreclosure of real estate mortga!JCS or 
deeds of trust, or on notes secured thereby, in any court of record m the 
state of Iowa, white this act is in effect, the court, upon the application of 
the owner or owners of such real estate or persons liable on said mortgages 
or deed of trust, or notes secured thereby, who are defendants in said cause 
and not in default for want of pleading or appearance shalt, unless upon 
hearing on said application good cause is shown to the contrary, order such 
cause continued until March 1st, 1935, or so long as this act is in effect, 
providing however, that in all causes now pending in which default has been 
entered but no decree signed, said owner or owners of such real estate or 
persons liable on said mortgages or deeds of trust, or notes secured thereby, 
shall have ten days from the taking effect of this act in which to file said 
application for continuance, and upon such order of continuance the court 
shall make order or orders for possession of said real estate, giving prefer-
ence to the owner or owners in possession. determine fair rental terms to 
be paid by the party or parties to be in possession and the application and 
distribution of the rents, income and profits from said real estate, and make 
such provision for the '?reservation of said property as will be just and 
equitable during the continuance of said cause, which order or orders shalt 
provide that such rents, income or profits shall be paid to and distributed by 
the Oerk of the District Court of the county in which said suit is pending, 
and further provide that in such distribution taxes, insurance, cost of main-
tenance and upkeep of said real estate shall be paid in the priority named, 
and any balance d1Stributed as the court may further direct; provided, how-
ever, that the court shall, upon a substantial violation of its said order or 
orders, or for other good and sufficient cause, set aside said order or con-
tinuance and the cause shall proceed to trial as by law now provided, the 
provisions of this act to the contrary notwithstanding. 
SECTION 3. For the purpose of the administration of this act, the court 
may in all cases suggest and recommend conciliation. . 
SECTION 4. All acts and parts of acts in con8ict with this act are sus-
pended while this act is in effect. 
SECTION 5. From and after the first day of March, 1935, this act shall 
cease to be in force. 
SECTION 6. This act being brought forth to meet an emergency through 
the police power of the state and being deemed of immediate importance 
shall be in full force and effect after its passage and publication in the Fort 
Dodge Messenger, a newspaper published at Fort Dodge, Iowa, and the 
Sibley Gazette-Tribune, a newspaper published at Sibley, Iowa. 
(This bill was signed by the governor Feb. 8, 1933.) 
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TABLE I. NUMBER OF FORECLOSURES BY LENDERS IN 15 COUNTlES, 
1915.1932• 
u. 
• ~-a Year Bs 11 : II ea :s e ;f .5 a o ... u Q.3 
1 2 3 
1915 23 
-
7 
1916 29 
-- 1 1917 11 3 1918 17 5 
1919 8 2 
1920 17 1 4 
1921 80 1 29 
1922 215 7 60 
1923 173 15 11 
1924 235 31 93 
1925 205 46 11 
1926 
----
203 37 65 
1927 205 16 71 
1928 136 65 64 
1929 91 72 45 
1930 91 82 50 
1931 155 225 71 
1932 .. 217 465 87 
Total 2123 1132 808 
Percent 
---
45.3 24.2 17.3 
·"The 15 counties are listed ln table IV • 
.. To Dee. t, 1932. 
a 
u 11 ... 1-i 2 .. .. 
- i: i: r! 
a,i: I! .8 ;i .a ~o i: a .. .,, M Ki i o a !J .51 ·- .. ~ :ii 8 ~ ... :ii .5 
. 4 5 6 7-8 
l 
- - -
31 
4 -- - 2 29 
- -
18 
I 
- - 3 26 3 
- -
16 
1 
- -
1 24 
6 
-
2 124 
21 1 1 1 311 26 1 7 300 
40 4 4 3 406 39 8 1 386 
22 2 10 4 343 
19 2 9 5 387 
12 5 12 1 295 
10 4 18 3 249 
9 3 1l 9 261 
16 17 51 8 543 
15 69 78 5 936 
245 107 203 67 4685 
5.2 2.3 4.3 1.4 too 
TABLE II. PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ACREAGE IN FORECLOSURE AND 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ACREAGE INVOLVED IN DEFICIENCEY JUJ>U. 
MENTS DY PERIODS. 1921·32. · 
Count)' Total acreage in percent I bdicieRCJ" acreairc 1n percent 
19.:.U-25 1926-30 1931-32 1921·25 1926-30 1931-32 
Boone 4.0 2.1 2.1 1.03 .73 . 1.79 
Cedar 2.6 2.1 2.S 1.23 t.18 1.99 Cerro Gordo 7.0 6.8 S.8 
Cherokee 2.9 2.5 '3.0 7z 71 T.95 
Clarke 6.8 7.3 ll.3 4.96 4.89 1.84 
Fa,ettc 2.6 5.2 3.7 1.02 t.75 2.85 
Gutbrie 7.0 4.9 5.8 2.83 3.32 5.28 
Hancock 4.8 7.3 4.5 1.70 3.60 4.02 
Harrison 6.7 4.9 3.8 3.52 2.27 3.14 
Ldfcnon 3.2 4.2 3.4 1.09 3.21 3.01 
nn 3.5 3.2 2.5 .82 l.68 2.06 kl:.:'~ery 2.4 2.0 5.4 .96 .98 4.15 2.6 1.8 3.7 .97 .96 3.34 
Pocaliontu 3.5 5.7 4.7 1.06 2.30 3.84 
Story 4.3 4.8 4.2 1.05 .66 3.47 
Anrage 4.28 4.31 4.39 t.O t.97 3.38 
·rAULE lll. JUDGMENTS lN FARM MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE BY LENI>ERS IN 15 COUNTIES AND ESTIMATED STATE 
TOTAL, 1915-1932 
r Private ln•urance I>eoo•it l\lortgai:e Federal oint stock Misc. Total 15 
____ !___________ -------~ -I 
yea I jnvestora companies I bank• I com1•anies I land bank I_ fand banks I inve•tors counties 
191 s ......................................... - .......... 1 $ 112,398\, •• ___ ... 1 $ 126,95<,I; S,Z981$ ...... - ......... J$ ....•..• _ •. __ I$ ......... -.!$ 244,655 ,, 
I 
1916 ...................................................... 159,423 ................ -..... 
····-··-m ·-··-2o:s22 •-•••oloo-•OH ....... -...... -... ····-·-455 159,423 1917 -··-··--···--··---····-··--······· 70,959 
-·ff;s-84 ··--···--····· 
...... __ ,. ___ 92,604 
1918 ---····-·--····-··-·········-----·····- 1C6,162 29,34l 6,550 --·-···-··· -.. ····---- ·····-··i::io7 159,636 1919 -····--·--·-···········-······-··-··········· 20,496 
-·-···5;;;48 9,434 6,215 ••••H....,•-·•-u• .................. -.... 37,470 
1920 ···-····-···-·······---··-···-·-· .. •·•·••• 59,607 7,10!. 21,355 ---·-···--....... -·--· .. ········ 2,900 96,719 
1921 ·-·······-·······-·-·-............................ 960,927 74,143 260,391 44,CIS 
--.. ·-·--···-
................... 2,275 1,341,756 
1922 ·····-··-·-··-···-·--·-··-·····-···-- 2,777,242 85,4117 442,30( 110,519 ··-··15;9·j6 9,627 41,977 3,467,152 1923 -·--·-··---···-··---······--·-·· 2,246,847 204,541 877,91· 11!2,374 16,204 92,745 3,636,601 1924 ...................................................... J,140,093 425,851 997,99·. 392,517 .................... 59,116 40,599 5,056,230 
1925 -···-·-···--····-····-······-······-··· •.• 2,37J,487 613,218 923,891 244,525 43,t 17 90,402 96,595 4,385,235 
1926 -···-··-··-·····-······-·-···-······-··-··· 2,039,959 610,974 581,86( 128,771 12,399 134,155 23,367 3,531,485 
1927 -···········-·-····-····--······-··-··-··· 2,167,519 1,115,026 655,343 107,041 9,061 150,251 88,064 4,292,305 
1928 -··········-···-·-······-·-··-·······-····· 1,486,573 t,038,303 665,513 72,973 36,389 117,977 11,816 3,429,544 
1929 ·············-,······---·-···············-··-··· 1,115,021! 1,057,947 307,224 152,130 42,440 269,545 21,615 2,965,929 
1930 ----·-··---·-···-··-··-··-··-··· 744,090 1,261,225 403,191 87,9251 30,015 129,427 72,967 2,727,840 
1931 --···············----··--············-··· 1,278,951 3,374,928 731,81~ 292,080 190,844 685,529 62,050 6,616,201 
1932" ···-··················-··-······-··········--· 1,689,944 6,896,158 576,705 135,121 699,720 1,042,119 31,084 11,070,851 
Total ........................... ·---····-··-·--··1$22,549,705 $16.781,llT 7.596.418 2,010,251 l,079,9Cll 2,704,412 589,816 53,311,636 
J•.rcrnl ·······-········-··· .. ··· .. ·······-····· .. ··· 42.3 31.S 14.2 3.8 2.0 5.1 I.I 100 
"To Dre. I, 1932. 
E<tilllared 
total for 
state 
1,524,200.65 
993,205.29 
576,922.92 
994,532.28 
233,438.10 
602,559.37 
8,359, I 39.88 
21,600,356.96 
22,656,024.23 
31,500,312.90 
27,320,014.0S 
22,001,151.55 ~ 
26,741,060.15 
21,366,059.12 
18,477,737.67 
16,994,443.20 
41,218,932.23 
68,971,401.73 
332, 131,492.28 
TAULE JV. ACREAGE INVOLVED IN FARM MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE IN lS COUNTIES, 1915·1932• 
--
.g ?:' u 
u H ..... ll u 1 1:1 e "3 Year I I I !.:) u ~ u -~ a ~ a .... .. ... .. ·c ~ " au " .. ~ 0 ... .. g l ... ] .. .. ~ .. .. -s a ~ a a .. u-g .. " ... " " :a c: " g .. !! ... 0 ~ .. ;;I ... ::a ~ ~g = tJ tJ !.:) :::: ..... '4 ~ 
1915 -·---·-··---·- 77 240 560 718 960 370 88 
--· SOJ 2381 397 32 240 --· .. 120 4,543
1 
.09 
1916 -··-··--·-··--·--·-· 246 80 174 72 974 382 80 200 130 317 398 --· ·--- 275 ---· 3,328 .06 
1917 '--·····-·---··-··-··--···-- ... o•- 120 390 -·- 10 400 
-359 
400 502 -··- 235 
---· -- ··--
60 2,117 .04 
1918 -····--··-··--···-·-··-··· 10 80 sos 
-jzii 52( 160 640 808 290 747 -· ... - --- -H- 8 4,127 .08 1919 -·-·····-·--·-·-··-··-··-·- 40 --- 200 12( ···-40 ---35 320 335 102 220 134 -- 252 118 1,841 .03 1920 ·-··--· .. ···-··-·-··-·-.. 292 ·--· 160 160 -~- 902 95 260 ·-·· -- -- 174 2,488 .OS 
1921 ____ ........... ._ .......... -·--· 1,861 405 1,044 520 1,800 744 2,589 1,630 3,373 645 1,892 134 959 439 781 18,816 .36 
-1922 ---··-········-····---····· 2,951 1,570 2,600 2,962 S,110 1,440 7,013 3,1 WI 4,222 1,714 3,333 2,635 1,690 1,995 2,266 44,619 .85 '.I 
1923 ·-·-······-····--··-·-·-···- 2,350 1,400 3,740 2,997 4,459 2,222 5,876 4,543 3,315 1,912 3,760 1,108 1,138 2,026 3,330 44,076 .84 '.I 
1924 --·····----·----··-·- 3,696 4,822 10.059 2,374 2,971 4,893 5,190 4,059 10,834 830 2,618 1,773 2,335 3,519 2,880 62,853 1.19 
l!IZ5 ----·--·-··--···--· 3,299 717 6,874 1,560 3,452 2,307 4,710 3,725 7,091 3,146 2,942 3,049 914 4,924 6,046 54,816 1.04 
1926 --·--···--···-·-··--··-··· 1,1)04 520 5,012 2,354 4,062 4,826 4,723 4,633 S,600 1,839 1,476 1,574 1,091 S,354 4,895 49,863 .95 
1927 -··-····---·······-··--····· l,'>IJ 2,324 6,054 2,935 2,910 4,264 3,676 8,336 5,223 1,291 1,796 2,755 1,216 6,088 5,736 56,517 1.07 1928 -------······· ......... - ••. 1,575 1,448 3,401 920 J,615 4,253 3,574 5,443 5,366 2,899 2,921 1,700 954 4,140 3,947 46,156 .88 
1921) ---··-··--·-····-...... ,_,,, 1,020 1,959 2,965 1,206 4,327 S,656 2,730 J,541 3,080 1,986 4,380 520 520 2,526 1,088 37,504 .71 
1930 ···--··--------·- 82J 977 5,914 1,567 3,97i 4,172 2,883 3,608 1,751 2,855 2,491 745 910 2,622 1,494 36,789 .70 
1931 ···--···--··-··-·-·-- t,433 2,735 6,053 4,722 18,625 5,936 8,357 6,819 4,355 4,220 2,896 8,000 3,045 4,773 4,162 86,131 1.63 
1932 .. -·--··--···-- 5,727 6,089 14,049 6,066 15,860 10,664 12,653 8,940 11,904 4,620 7,419 11,553 CS,875 12,203 10,565 145,187 2.76 
Tola! - .. ---·------· 29,117 25,486 69,754 31,453 73,752 $2,i29 64,646 59,955 69,294 28,999 40,181 35,712 21,887 St,136 47,670 701,771 13.3 
Percent of 1111 land----·- 8.3 7.3 20.2 8.8 28.4 11.9 17.9 17.0 16.1 11.2 9.7 9.9 8.2 14.1 13.4 13.3 
•Where 11 farm was involved In more than one foreclosure in the aamc 7car, the 11crcagc was counted only once • 
.. To Dec:. l, 1932. 
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TADLE V. NUMBER OF DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS IN FARM MORTGAG1' 
FORECLOSURE SALES BY LENDERS, 14 COUNTIES, 1915·32 
., 
" 0 
"l'.J .... 
"' 
,,..., u 
.. ~ ~·= ... ~ _c 8"' c"' Year Iii~ _c .... -;; .2 I!!. ";j11 1!.l! ;.a =o u-
.. :i o.,. -c. "- t!l'.l s 
·- > ~E "'c ~E .,,, ~ C"' Q,l! .,c ·- c ·- > 0 it.s co ~e ~ ~.5 .... u C>...!l i... 
1915 
....... ·--···-··--··-.. 
2 
--· 
3 1 •u--• 
--· .. ---
6 
1916 
···---·-··-·-•••-•H• 4 ---· ·--- ·-·· ... --·· ·-·· --- 4 1917 
------·-·-·-
1 1 
-· ···-·- ·--
2 
1918 ......... _.. ... _. __ ............ _ 2 1 I 
-- --- ·-·- --
4 
1919 
---------····-···· ·--·3 ...,_,,OH --· --· -··· --·-· 1920 
·--··---·-·-
.......... 00-H I 
-·· --
.......... 4 
1921 
---------·-· 
25 
••-:t s 1 ·- ·-· -- 31 1922 
--·-----
68 7 7 
-- ·---· 
-3 83 1923 
-··---
75 2 17 6 
--
103 
1924 
--··-------
84 4 28 12 2 2 132 
1925 
·--.---.. ---·-
80 14 22 18 2 6 l 143 
1926 _ ................ -.---- 78 tt 34 6 2 s l 137 
1927 69 19 27 6 l 8 1 131 
1928 
---
. SJ 10 37 8 s 11 124 
1929 UHH ______ 36 20 20 8 3 13 -2 102 
1930 49 30 27 5 1 9 8 129 
1931 
·-····-----
I02 132 .S3 14 13 49 5· 368 
1932• 131 304 59 10 SS 64 s 628 
Total 862 548 340 104 82 167 28 2,131 
All foreclosurl!S 
--
1,930 975 747 233 91 196 64 4,236 
Percent of all 
foreclosurl!S 
--
44.7 56.2 45.S 44.6 90.1 85.2 43.8 50.3 
•To Dec. 1, 1932. 
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TABLE VI. NUMBER AND SIZE OF DE1'1CIENCY JUDGMENTS, 
14 COUNTIES-1915·1932 
Number Amount 
:I :I 
.5 = 
'O ~ u ... :I !! ... ... ... !! Year ! 5li -! cu .. 0 s: 
-= 
us: s: ;: " 5-g ..!e 
.:. ·;; e. -;!i·~n 
<ti ~-i ~ 'ti-= i:- --.ca "!!1 :::.=. it:; ~!~ Q p...S ..... 
1915 -·---· 28 6 21.4 $ 20,758 $ 6,205 29.9 
1916 .. 27 4 14.8 25,702 7,912 30.8 
1917 16 2 12.5 5,781 1,691 29.3 
1918 ---- 24 4 16.6 42,583 32,186 75.6 
1919 ----- 15 i7;i --22,362 1920 ---- 23 4 47,619 .fi:O 
1921 ----- 117 31 26.S 391,876 IJ0.276 33.2 
1922 ··--· .. -- 292 83 28.4 1,111,086 211t,S67 24.0 
1923 ··-·---·· 280 103 36.8 1,485,759 30 ,220 20.6 
1924 ---- 337 132 39.2 1,887,476 365,046 19.3 
1925-- 339 143 4::!.2 1,905,501 311,707 16.4 
1926--- 310 137 44.2 1,578,493 257,818 16.l 
1927 347 131 37.8 1,487,016 284,676 19.1 
1928 277 124 44.8 1,370,305 344 128 25.1 
1929-- 225 102 45.3 1,343,673 21s:5u 16.l 
1930--- 224 129 57.6 1,317,789 227,191 17.2 
1931 -·-- 507 I 368 72.6 4,520,545 739,512 16.4 193Z- 848 628 74.1 7,871,053 934,068 11.9 Total 4,236 2,131 I S0.3 $26,413,015 $4,456,080 16.9 
•To Dec. 1, 1932. 

